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Introduction
Backstop technologies are a common point of reference in dynamic models of the environment and natural resources, beginning with the influential study by Nordhaus (1973) on exhaustible sources of energy. There, a backstop technology essentially involves access to a resource with an infinite stock. More recently, in the context of the expanding literature on the economics of stock pollutants, "the backstop" has become a shorthand for perfectly clean technologies that do not suffer from a stock pollution problem. In both cases, the backstop allows the decision maker to escape a binding constraint forever.
The existing literature on backstops offers optimal timing rules regarding the phasing in of a backstop in a variety of different settings and under varying degrees of uncertainty. In the area of non-renewable resources, Dasgupta and Heal (1974) study optimal exhaustion when the arrival time of the exogenously provided backstop technology is stochastic. Hung and Quyen (1993) endogenize the decision when to invest in R&D in a setting where the length of time required to develop the backstop is uncertain. Tsur and Zemel (2003) develop a deterministic model with the difference that the backstop can be continuously improved through additional R&D. Just et al. (2005) provide a stochastic, but discrete analysis of a similar problem. In the context of stock pollution Baudry (2000) applies real options theory in a setting where the backstop arrives stochastically after R&D is commenced; and Fischer et al. (2004) consider the optimal investment path for an existing clean backstop technology.
One type of uncertainty that has not been considered so far in the litera-2 Boomerangs and Backstops ture is uncertainty about the characteristics of new technologies. Commonly, models rely on an assumption of technological certainty in R&D: If the backstop is not already available, the next technology to be invented will always constitute a backstop. A well defined R&D investment will therefore always generate a final resolution of the intertemporal constraint. Looking at the empirical record, this idea is at least arguable. Two prominent examples illustrate this point: In the case of ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), newly developed substitutes such as HCFC-123 were demonstrated to feature a more benign stratospheric chemistry, but also shown to imply a different stock pollution problem on account of decaying into toxic pollutants such as trifluoroacetic acid. The primary substitute for fossil fuels, nuclear energy, may provide advantageous properties with respect to exhaustibility, but involves the production of long-lived stocks of radioactive waste. These are only two illustrations of a more general observation, namely that technologies developed in response to binding intertemporal constraints may relax those constraints, but will not always allow decision-makers to escape them indefinitely. In such a situation, investments in R&D have to be considered under the premise that the arrival of a backstop is only one of two possible outcomes of the innovation process. Instead, R&D may generate a technology that is novel, but has stings attached in the form of an intertemporal pollution dynamic of its own. The possibility of the intertemporal constraint recurring even after R&D resources have been expended is the possibility of technological 'boomerangs' that the title refers to.
In this paper, we study the implications of allowing for technological uncer-tainty over innovation outcomes on optimal R&D timing, choosing the context of stock pollutants as a setting. To model technological uncertainty, we consider a decision-maker who attaches a probability to the possibility that new technologies may not turn out to be the clean backstop that will solve the pollution problem once and for all, and we allow these beliefs about the probabilities to become decision-relevant. This small change in the assumptions about the decision-maker's view about the likely environmental characteristics of new technologies has important repercussions for his thinking about pollution policies and R&D timing. The change extends the set of possible future states of the world to situations where new technologies turn out to have undesirable properties. This means that R&D may have to be undertaken more than once in order to solve the pollution problem. In fact, the possibility of lengthy sequences of failures to find a backstop despite R&D investment can no longer be excluded by the planner. This has repercussions for the optimal pollution policy since future costs of current emissions depend on the degree of uncertainty over the discovery of a backstop.
While it seems clear that the possibility of receiving (possibly multiple) technologies of the 'boomerang' type in the quest for a backstop should change the optimal prescriptions both for environmental and for technology policy, the precise nature of these changes is less obvious. Should the policymaker's respond to the presence of technological uncertainty with higher or lower R&D efforts?
Should R&D be carried out on a large scale right at the start (frontloaded) or spread out over time? How should the policymaker respond to the invention of a 'boomerang' technology -with more R&D right away or with waiting?
Should R&D ever stop even though a backstop has not been found yet? We develop a specific setting in which these questions can be answered on the basis of analytical solutions. This is in order to develop a first intuition on the impact of technological uncertainty on optimal R&D and in order to provide a building block for considering more general cases in the future.
The simple and tractable model consists of a production sector producing a single product up to a fixed output constraint, with one technology of the boomerang type available ab initio. Production generates a profile of technology-specific pollutants. Once a backstop is available, that part of production carried out using the backstop will produce no pollution at all. Damages are convex in the stock of each pollutant and additive across pollutants, giving rise to gains from diversification in pollutants and hence incentives for conducting R&D even when a backstop is not feasible. To retain a clear focus on the role of uncertainty, other important R&D drivers whose impacts have been established in the literature are excluded from the analysis. R&D has a deterministic component in that at any given time, a new technology with zero stock of initial pollution can be provided at a fixed cost. What is uncertain, however, are the environmental characteristics of the new technology. Under the decision-maker's beliefs, R&D carried out at a given point in time will fail to generate a backstop with a certain probability and will generate a technology involving a new stock pollutant instead. Given this setting, we study the optimal timing of R&D and the optimal pollution policy.
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In order derive the optimal R&D trajectory we utilize recent results on multi-stage optimal control with infinite horizons. This technique allows us to capture a process of technological evolution in which new technologies are added in a discrete fashion while allowing for more than one technology to be added at any given point in time. In addition to applying this technique to the question of optimal R&D trajectories, we present -to our knowledge -the first application of this technique to a situation characterized by uncertainty over the properties of the next stage of the optimal control problem. This involves a suitable modification of the necessary conditions derived by Makris (2001) and Tomiyama (1985) .
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Our key findings are that in our setting the optimal R&D program is (i) strictly sequential in the sense that at most one technology is developed at any given point in time and (ii) has an endogenous stopping point. There is a constant pollution stock threshold level that triggers research and is above the long run steady state of pollution stocks (overshooting). Technological uncertainty affects both the optimal timing and the maximum size of the technology portfolio. The optimal pollution policy becomes more sophisticated if research fails to deliver a backstop technology.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In the next section, we describe the model set-up. Section 3 develops the optimal pollution policy for a given number of technologies. In section 4 we study the optimal timing of R&D under technological uncertainty and we conclude in section 5.
The Model
The model consists of two fundamental components, one describing the nature of the stock pollution problem and the other the process of innovation. Jointly, they describe the social planner's problem of developing a simultaneous environmental and innovation policy under technological uncertainty.
The environmental side of our model consists of standard pollution stock dynamics common in this literature (for example Fischer et al. (2004 ), Baudry (2000 ). At time t, there are n (t) different potential pollutants i ∈ {1, ..., n (t)} with associated stock levels S i (t) with stock dynamics of the type:
with α i denoting the rate of accumulation on the basis of emissions of volume q i and δ i denoting the rate of decay in the stock of pollutant i.
Pollutants are technology-specific and, in the interest of tractability, do not interact with each other. Hence, i denotes both the technology and the single pollutant generated by this technology. The pollution damage function is additively separable in the square of individual stocks of pollutants such that pollution damage D S 1 (t), ..., S n(t) (t) caused by stocks S 1 (t) to S n(t) (t) at time
with d i denoting the marginal damage coefficient of pollutant i.
In order to retain a clear focus on an analytical assessment of the impact of technological uncertainty, the model contains some important simplifications regarding heterogeneity of pollutants and the shape of the social welfare function:
With the exception of the backstop, technologies and pollutants respectively are assumed to be symmetric in terms of rate of accumulation α i = α, rate of decay Baudry (2000) . This is an indirect way of taking capital stock constraints into account.
The symmetry of the technologies in terms of the production-pollution side of the model then provides a simplified instantaneous welfare function of the form
in which non-backstop technologies now differ in terms of vintage only and the backstop technology differs in terms of damage intensity.
Innovation is modeled as follows: At any time t, society can choose to spend resources R (t) which will make available instantaneously and with certainty the is denoted by t n+1 . The number of technologies n(t) available for production at t therefore depends on the sequence of past investments {t 1 , ..., t n }. The environmental characteristics of the new technology are not known prior to its arrival. With probability p, the n + 1 st technology turns out to constitute a technology of the backstop type. In the event, the number of technologies remains fixed from then on as there is no further rationale for resources to be spent on R&D in a setting where technologies are otherwise perfect substitutes.
With probability (1 − p), the n + 1 st technology is of the boomerang type and involves the generation of a novel, technology-specific pollutant (see Figure 1 ).
In this case, knowing that a 'boomerang' has been produced, the social planner might decide to develop a further technology right away. Hence, in principle it is possible that more than one technology is developed at any given point in time.
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All new technologies start with an initial stock of pollution S n (t n ) = 0 and can at once be used at any level of intensity.
2 For convenience, we assume that the current cost of R&D is independent of time such that R (t) = R and that initially, one technology is available such that n (0) = 1. Furthermore, we assume that there is an arbitrarily large but finite number of potential technological solutions M that can possibly be developed. Each of these solutions is a simple lottery. At the instant they are converted into technologies by R&D they materialize either as a backstop (with probability p) or as a 'boomerang' (with probability 1 − p). Hence, p is independent of both the maximum number of technologies feasible, M , and of the number of technologies already developed, n.
The social planner's problem is to maximize the expected value of net welfare from production over an infinite time horizon, subject to the effects of stock pollution and subject to an R&D process that can produce backstops or 'boomerangs'. Its choice variables are on the one hand the production intensities q i (t) of the currently available technologies i ∈ {1, ..., n (t)} and on the other hand the timing of R&D activities {t 2 , t 3 ...} that expand the set of available technologies n (t) from n (0) = 1 up to a finite N ≤ M that is also endogenously determined. The problem is then
subject to conditions (1), (3), (4) and the transversality condition
To sum up, the nature of the planner's problem describes a situation in which the choice of pollution policy and R&D policy are linked in two ways. Firstly, the past history of R&D determines the planner's current degrees of freedom in allocating production shares to different technologies. Secondly, depending on research success regarding the backstop, additional R&D may optimally be undertaken or not.
The solution to the social planner's problem involves characterizing the control processes of production shares and R&D timing given the state processes of stock dynamics. The heuristic strategy involves separating the problems into an optimal pollution policy given the number and type of technologies already developed and the optimal R&D policy that determines the extension of the set of technologies at any given point in time.
The Optimal Pollution Policy
With uncertainty only entering at instants of innovation, the optimal pollution policy between any two innovation events is a standard deterministic Markovprocess where the number of state variables equals the number of available technologies. Conditional on the number and type of technologies and the pollution stocks at the beginning of the considered planning period, the optimal policy can be derived. This is done in this section while the optimal R&D policy is studied in Section 4. Note that while studying the optimal pollution policy the number of technologies remains fixed at n = n(t i ) for all t ∈ [t i , t i+1 ), i = {1, ..., N }, where t 1 = 0 is the arrival time of the first (free) technology.
Given the number of technologies n and their pollution stock levels S i (t), the Hamiltonian of this problem is
where µ i is the shadow price of pollution stock S i and κ n is the shadow price of the output constraint (3). The corresponding first order conditions are
Condition (8) gives rise to the following switching function
There are two cases to be distinguished regarding the optimal pollution policy. The first is the case of R&D having delivered a backstop technology.
The second is the case of no backstop having been invented yet. We start with the first case.
Production using the backstop involves no pollution. Once a technology of the backstop type is present, its shadow price µ Back i (t), i = n is therefore zero while that for all polluting technologies (i = 1, ..., n − 1) is strictly negative once they have accumulated positive stock S i (t) > 0. Hence, σ n (t) > σ i (t) for all i = 1, ..., n−1 with S i (t) > 0. It follows from (10) that output of all technologies of the boomerang type is zero unless their stock is zero. If indeed S i (t) = 0, for some i ∈ {1, ..., n−1} there will be an infinitely small time interval [t + dt] during which these polluting technologies will be employed. Otherwise, the backstop produces at full capacity since there are no costs attached to production such that
with superscript Back denoting outputs after a backstop has been invented.
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As a result, the stocks of polluting technologies then decrease according to
, ∀t ∈ [t n , ∞) .
Once the backstop is developed, the present setting provides no reason for further R&D. (a) The Singular Solution
Technologies for which the switching function (10) is zero
are on a singular path. Observe that the switching function is zero for more than one technology only if their stocks are symmetric. The following shadow price dynamics apply to all technologies on a singular path
Three relevant cases are considered:
Case 2: κ n > 0 andκ n = 0
Case 3: κ n > 0 andκ n = 0
Case 1
Here, supply falls short of the fixed unit demand and the constraint (3) is not binding (κ n = 0). Using the first order condition (9) and the shadow price dynamics (15) and (16) one gets
with the superscript Boom denoting output levels when no backstop is available. This is a steady state that is "incomplete" in the sense that the marginal damage of pollution outweighs the marginal benefit of production before the capacity constraint becomes binding. A higher discount rate, lower persistence of pollution, lower emission intensity and lower marginal damages increase output and stock levels of the incomplete steady state. Both, equilibrium output and pollution stock of technologies are independent of the number of technologies.
However, the condition for this steady state to exist
is a function of n. For each set of exogenous parameters thus, there is an upper bound of n above which the incomplete steady state is not feasible.
Case 2
This is the complete steady state as the demand constraint (3) is binding (κ n > 0) while the corresponding shadow price is constant (κ n = 0). Again, using (9), (15) and (16) one gets by imposing symmetry
Equilibrium output is completely determined by the number of available technologies. The steady state pollution stocks are a function of the pollution intensity α, the depreciation rate of pollution δ and the number of technologies.
The discount rate r and the slope of the damage function d do not affect the steady state. The complete steady state is feasible if and only if
holds. Note, that (19) and (22) are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
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Supply is at full capacity (κ n > 0) but the shadow price of a marginal increase of the production capacity is changing. Case 3 is therefore not a steady state.
From (9), (15) and (16) one gets by imposing symmetry
This is the most rapid approach path to a steady state when all technologies have equal initial pollution stocks. In t = 0 the economy has to be in this case because by assumption n(0) = 1. will be shown later, that the analysis also applies to all subsequent sequences of innovation. When k boomerangs are developed the pollution stocks are
Here, the singular condition (14) cannot hold for all technologies simultaneously but only for one of the two sets of technologies. Since
and therefore µ i (t n ) < µ j (t n ) it has to hold that σ i (t n ) < σ j (t n ). Due to (3), (14) can only hold for the k new technologies while for all n − k old technologies σ i (t n ) < 0 and hence
This is the most rapid approach path to a situation where pollution stocks of all technologies are equal. The corresponding stock dynamics are
, ∀t ∈ t n ,t n (29)
, ∀t ∈ t n ,t n
wheret n is the point in time where S i (t n ) = S j (t n ). Using (29) and (30) the point of convergence is at
Fromt n until the next innovation all technologies are used at equal shares and stocks grow according to the following 'Case 3'-process
, t >t n , l = 1, ..., n.
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The virtual starting point of this processt n is determined by
which yieldst
Hence, the path of the pollution stock after innovation and convergence (32) is exactly the same as the one were all n technologies are available at t = 0 (23).
Subsequent arrivals of boomerang technologies can therefore be analyzed by exactly the same procedure substituting in the respective new values for n and k.
This, however, hinges on the condition that innovation occurs after convergence has occurred. The alternative case is analyzed in (c) below.
(c) Innovation with Asymmetric Stocks
Assume a boomerang technology arrives at t n ∈ {t n−1 ,t n−1 } where pollution stocks of technologies {1, ..., n − k} have not yet converged. Again, it is optimal to follow the most rapid approach path, i.e.
Using a procedure analogous to that used to derivet n , the point in time where the stocks of technologies n−k and {n−k+1, ..., n} converge is determined
Whether or not this case ever arises depends on the optimal timing of R&D. This is analyzed in the next section. Note, that the optimal pollution policy after the development of a backstop technology (11) and (12) is not affected by asymmetric stocks.
4 The Optimal Timing of R&D
Setup of the Optimal Timing Decision for R&D
The previous section derived the optimal contingent pollution policies. Given these policies, the social planner faces the problem at which points in time to invest into R&D and thereby acquire a new technology that can turn out to be either of the backstop or the boomerang type.
The following analysis is based on recent results on multi-stage dynamic optimization techniques derived by Makris (2001) and Tomiyama (1985) . The application of the technique to the problem at hand is natural: Here, a stage is defined by reference to the number n of technologies available for production.
Switching between stages n and n + 1 involves carrying out R&D at cost R.
More than one switch can occur at any given point in time t ≥ 0, if optimal.
While the necessary conditions derived by Tomiyama (1985) and Makris (2001) are established in the context of a deterministic setting, they are easily modified for the simple discrete probability distribution studied here in order to account for the uncertainty regarding the type of technology developed at the point of switching.
Given the initial endowment of n(0) = 1 technologies the optimization problem is as follows
subject to (1), (3) and (7). This is equivalent to (6) with the exception that the optimal pollution policy has already been solved and that the path probabilities (see Figure 1 ) have been multiplied out. The corresponding Hamiltonian for each stage, where n technologies already exist, is
where the optimal q * i is conditional both on the number and type of existing technologies (see Section 3). Given the optimal pollution policies, the applicable necessary conditions for the optimal switching point are essentially those provided by Tomiyama (1985) and Makris (2001) , modified however for a setting of two possible outcomes. Two conditions then determine the optimal instant t * n+1 to undertake R&D in order to develop the n + 1 st technology. The first condition is a matching condition that requires that -in expected terms -the pollution shadow prices of existing technologies are not affected by innovation, i.e.
where µ Using both necessary conditions and substituting in the optimal pollution policies this yields (proof see appendix)
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Boomerangs and Backstops for the k th additional technology developed at instant t * n+1 . The optimal time to innovate is when the marginal gain of waiting (the left hand sides) is not higher than the expected marginal cost of doing so (the right hand sides).
The latter is determined by the difference between the expected shadow price of the new technology (E μ * n+k ) and that of the lowest pollution stock of an active technology (E (μ * n ) or E μ * n+k−1 ).
Characterization of the Optimal Innovation Policy
Here we present and prove the key results on the optimal innovation policy.
The emphasis is on developing the essential heuristic steps for characterizing the optimal policy, with some of the algebraic manipulation relegated to the appendix where indicated.
Proposition 1
There is no upfront innovation at the beginning of the planning period (t = 0). 
Proposition 2
Innovation is sequential. At most one technology is developed at any point in time.
Proof. If more than one technology is developed (k > 1) only the expected shadow prices of new technologies enter condition (43). Pollution stocks for both are zero. Reasoning along identical lines as in the proof for Proposition 1,
. Incorporating this into (43) yields that research is sequential unless R&D is for free (R = 0) or the social planner infinitely patient (r = 0).
More detail about the optimal timing of research is obtained by replacing the expected shadow prices in (43) with more explicit terms. First, rewrite (43) 24 Boomerangs and Backstops usingμ Back n+1 = 0 and k = 1 (Proposition 2) as follows
, t * n+1 > 0. andμ Boom n t * n+1 : Assuming the stocks of both boomerang technologies converge at some point in time (this assumption is shown to be correct in Proposition 3), technologies are at that point perfectly symmetric with respect to their exogenous parameters, stocks and optimal future pollution policies. Hence, at the point of convergence shadow prices of both technologies are the same. Using this link, it is possible to express one shadow price in terms of the other. Given the optimality of most rapid convergence except in the case of further innovations occurring in the meantime (see (27) and (28)), the relation is as follows (proof see appendix)
Substituting (44) and (46) into (45) yields the research trigger condition
This determines the optimal switching times t * 1 , ..., t * N and thereby the optimal number of technologies N if innovation occurs only when the pollution stocks of all existing technologies have converged. Hence, the next issue is to proof that this is indeed the case.
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Proposition 3
Innovation occurs only at instances at which all available technologies are used simultaneously.
Proof. nologies of the boomerang type are symmetric, the approach path to the steady state given one technology is active is also the evolution of the total aggregate pollution stock. Due to (2) this is not proportional to aggregate damages in the economy. The dashed horizontal lines indicate the (hypothetical) steady state levels for n = 1, n = 2 and n = 3. Based on (47), we can say more about the exact link between pollution (stocks) and R&D.
Proposition 4
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In the optimum innovation occurs whenever the pollution stock of any technology reaches a constant threshold levelS.
Proof. Time enters the research trigger condition (47) Having established this tight relation between pollution stocks and the timing of innovation we are now in a position to state some further properties of the optimal R&D and pollution trajectories. One important feature is the optimal procedure if R&D (repeatedly) fails to deliver the desired backstop technology.
The question here is whether research is carried out -potentially ad infinitum -until a backstop is developed or whether R&D eventually ceases even if the pollution problem has not been solved.
Proposition 5
The optimal R&D program has an endogenous stopping point. However, if it is never optimal to undertake R&D, i.e. if α δ ≤S, the pollution stock of the only available technology never exceeds its long run steady state.
The same holds if M <N and the sequence of innovations stops because the set of potential ideas to solve the pollution problem is exhausted. In this case the long run steady state is above the innovation trigger level, but no R&D occurs because the economy is short of new ideas.
Hence, even if there is a specific long run pollution target (say for the carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere), it can be optimal to exceed this level for some (repeated) periods of time. 5 Moreover, both the periods when stocks overshoot as well as the time between two such periods increases in the number of available boomerang technologies.
Proposition 7
The time between successive innovations is increasing in the number of already available technologies.
Proof. After a new technology is developed pollution stocks converge. This process takest n+1 − t n+1 . According to (31) the length of this period is independent of the number of technologies already available. The next innovation is triggered if all pollution stocks simultaneously reachS again. Since after convergence is completed all technologies are used at a rate of 1/(n + 1), which is decreasing in n, the time that passes between successive innovations increases in n.
Although there is no upfront innovation (Proposition 1) the R&D program is front loaded in a sense that the 'density' of innovations, i.e. the number of innovations within a given but sufficiently large interval of time, is decreasing in time.
So far the probability of a backstop to arrive by virtue of R&D did not affect the validity of any of the previous propositions. However, it is an important determinant of the optimal timing of research.
Proposition 8
The maximum number of technologies developed, N , is weakly increasing in the probability, p, that a backstop is developed by R&D. The time between successive innovations is strictly decreasing in p.
Boomerangs and Backstops
Proof. Total differentiating (47) yields dS dp
The pollution stock thresholdS is decreasing in p. However, N is weakly decreasing inS (see proof of Proposition 5). In addition, the time between successive innovations is increasing inS (see Figure 2 ). Both the time interval pollution stocks require to converge (see (31)) and the time interval spent rebuilding pollution stocks back toS are reduced.
The intuition is straightforward. A backstop technology is always more desirable than a technology of the boomerang type. Increasing the probability that research produces a backstop while keeping the costs of R&D, R, constant, makes research more attractive. It is carried out earlier and potentially more often. Note, however, that in contrast to the maximum number the expected number of innovations can decrease in p. Since research ceases as soon as a backstop is developed, which becomes more likely, it becomes less likely that the technology portfolio actually reaches its upper bound N . Figure 3 this occurs, e.g. when increasing p from zero to 0.25 (the latter appears also in Figure 2 ). In both cases N = 3 since it is the largest S SteadyState n that is below the respectiveS(p).
Conclusion
In much of the literature on environmental R&D, it is common to assume that the outcome of the next (or most recent) R&D effort will be a backstop technology that resolves the intertemporal constraints of the environmental problem forever. This is a productive modeling shortcut that has enabled important results on the optimal timing of R&D to be derived under very general conditions. However, its premise is empirically at least arguable, as we illustrate with two prominent examples. In this paper, we consider a situation in which the next R&D effort generates two possible types of technology, either a backstop technology or another polluting technology (referred to as a 'boomerang'). The type of technology generated is only revealed after R&D expenditure has been incurred. We analyze the impact of this technological uncertainty on the optimal R&D and pollution policy for a policymaker faced with stock pollution and costly R&D. We develop a simple and tractable model in which we apply and extend recent results on the necessary conditions of multi-stage optimal control problems to our problem. This allows an intuitive and natural representation of the discrete nature of technological change that we want to capture here.
We also provide a small, but novel extension of the theory to simple discrete probability distributions over possible stages based on the policymaker's beliefs about the relative likelihood of a backstop or a 'boomerang'.
The paper provides a full characterization of the optimal policy in the context of the model. Given the optimal pollution policy, the degree of technological uncertainty does not affect the fundamental structure of the optimal R&D pol-Boomerangs and Backstops icy, which is strictly sequential and has an endogenous stopping point. However, the timing of innovations and the maximum size of the technology portfolio are affected: To the extent that invention of a backstop becomes less likely, R&D is carried out later and the maximum number of technologies is smaller. The lower productivity of R&D in expected terms spills over into environmental policy in the form of higher equilibrium pollution stocks.
The properties of the optimal policy depend technically on the assumptions about the welfare function, the nature of the pollution problem, the capacity constraint in output, and the specific characterization of R&D. Some qualifications are therefore in order. First, generalizations of the welfare function (5) and relaxation of the output constraint will give rise to additional motives for carrying out R&D for reasons that are well known from the literature on R&D, such as cost savings and more benign environmental characteristics etc. Overall R&D effort will be higher therefore, but for reasons unrelated to technological uncertainty. To the extent that capital stock effects are relevant, costs or benefits are no longer linear in output and the pollution policy will evolve more smoothly. However, the effects on the optimal R&D policy are unlikely to affect its fundamental character that is grounded in the evolution of the pollution stock. Generalized pollution dynamics, on the other hand (see e.g. Tahvonen and Salo (1996) ), would lead in some cases to ambiguous effects on the optimal policy choice. It is generalizations of this type that are important areas for future research.
A Appendix
A.1 Combining the necessary conditions: (40) and (41) to (42) and (43) Condition (41) 
